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GHSL-2020-240: Command injection in scikit-learn/scikit-learn workflow | GitHub Security Lab

skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 2020-11-26-2020-12-01: Report sent to various maintainers. 2020-12-01: Report acknowledged. 2020-12-01: Issue resolved. Summary The ‘sync_pull_request.yml’ GitHub workflow is vulnerable to arbitrary command injection.

Product scikit-learn/scikit-learn GitHub repository Tested Version The latest changeset 12f1521 to the date. Details Issue: The forked branch name is used to format a shell command When a label ci sync is assigned to a PR it automatically starts the GitHub workflow. The forked branch name is used to format a bash script. name : Sync Pull Request on : pull_request_target : types : [ labeled ] jobs : sync_pull_request : runs-on : ubuntu-latest if : contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ci sync') steps : ... - name : Sync with master run : | set -xe git remote add pr_remote ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.html_url }} git fetch pr_remote ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} ...

If an authorized person is tricked into assigning the label on a specially crafted PR this vulnerability allows for arbitrary command injection into the bash script. For a Proof of Concept create a PR from branch named main;echo${IFS}"abc";exit${IFS}0 . Impact The injection allows for exfiltration of the temporary GitHub repository authorization token to the attacker controlled server. Although the token is not valid after the workflow finishes, since the attacker controls the execution of the workflow he or she can delay it to give the malicious server time to modify the repository.

Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski) . Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2020-240 in any communication regarding this issue.