GHSL-2023-022: Command Injection in an Apache Cloudstack CI workflow | GitHub Security Lab
skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 2023-02-06: Issue reported to the Apache security team. 2023-02-07: Apache security team confirms receipt. 2023-02-23: Apache security team updates us, that the report was missed, but finally re-delivered to the CloudStack team.
2023-02-27: The issue was resolved. 2023-02-28: An additional issue was noticed and reported. 2023-05-09: The issue was resolved. Summary Apache Cloudstack is vulnerable to a Command Injection in sonar-check.yml . Product Apache Cloudstack Tested Version 62e342c Details Issue: Command Injection in Actions sonar-check.yml workflow ( GHSL-2023-022 ) The sonar-check.yml workflow is triggered on pull_request_target (i.e., when a Pull Request against the base repository is created or updated), which also covers the case when the Pull Request is originated from a fork.
The workflow starts with full write GitHub repository token since the defaults aren’t altered. Taking the above into account, this workflow runs the following step with data controlled by said fork ( ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} – the name of the fork’s branch), allowing an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner and run custom commands (potentially stealing secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN , SONAR_TOKEN ) and altering the repository. - name : Run Build and Tests with Coverage id : coverage env : GITHUB_TOKEN : ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} SONAR_TOKEN : ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }} PR_ID : ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} run : | git clone https://github.com/shapeblue/cloudstack-nonoss.git nonoss cd nonoss && bash -x install-non-oss.sh && cd .. mvn -P quality -Dsimulator -Dnoredist clean install org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:sonar -Dsonar.projectKey=apache_cloudstack -Dsonar.pullrequest.key=$PR_ID -Dsonar.pullrequest.branch=${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} -Dsonar.pullrequest.github.repository=apache/cloudstack -Dsonar.pullrequest.provider=GitHub -Dsonar.pullrequest.github.summary_comment=true Proof of Concept Fork the apache/cloudstack repository, whose name we will refer as username/cloudstack-fork .
Create a branch in username/cloudstack-fork with the name main;echo${IFS}"hello";# . Push any change to the former branch. Create a pull request from username/cloudstack-fork:main;echo${IFS}"hello";# to apache/cloudstack:main . Check the workflow runs for the new Actions run that will execute the command echo "hello" . Impact This issue may lead to stealing workflow secrets and modification of the repository. Resources CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team members @jorgectf (Jorge Rosillo) and @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski) .
Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2023-022 in any communication regarding this issue.