PEP 8013 – The External Council Governance Model | peps.python.org
PEP 8013 – The External Council Governance Model PEP 8013 – The External Council Governance Model Author : Steve Dower <steve.dower at python.org> Status : Rejected Type : Informational Topic : Governance Created : 14-Sep-2018 Table of Contents Abstract PEP Rejection The Importance of the Grey Area Model Overview Key people and their functions Regular decision process Controversial decision process Election terms Election voting process No-confidence voting process Examples of intended behaviour Scenario 1 - The Case of the Vague PEP Scenario 2 - The Case of the Endless Discussion Scenario 3 - The Case of the Unconsidered Users Scenario 4 - The Case of the Delegated Decision Copyright Abstract This PEP proposes a new model of Python governance based on a Council of Auditors (CoA) tasked with making final decisions for the language.
It differs from PEP 8010 by specifically not proposing a central singular leader, and from PEP 8011 by disallowing core committers from being council members. It describes the size and role of the council, how the initial group of council members will be chosen, any term limits of the council members, and how successors will be elected. It also spends significant time discussing the intended behaviour of this model. By design, many processes are not specified here but are left to the people involved.
In order to select people who will make the best decisions, it is important for those involved to understand the expectations of the CoA but it is equally important to allow the CoA the freedom to adjust process requirements for varying circumstances. This only works when process is unspecified, but all participants have similar expectations. This PEP does not name the members of the CoA. Should this model be adopted, it will be codified in PEP 13 along with the names of all officeholders described in this PEP.
PEP Rejection PEP 8013 was rejected by a core developer vote described in PEP 8001 on Monday, December 17, 2018. PEP 8016 and the governance model it describes were chosen instead. The Importance of the Grey Area In any actual decision-making process, there is going to be grey area. This includes unexpected scenarios, and cases where there is no “correct” answer. Many process plans attempt to minimise grey area by defining processes clearly enough that no flexibility is required.
This proposal deliberately goes the other way. The aim is to provide a robust framework for choosing the best people to handle unexpected situations, without defining how those people should handle those situations. Examples are provided of “good” responses to some situations as an illustration. The hope is that the “best” people are the best because they would live up to those examples. The process that is proposed has been designed to minimise the damage that may be caused when those people turn out not to be the best.
Grey area is guaranteed to exist. This proposal deliberately embraces and works within that, rather than attempting to prevent it. Model Overview Key people and their functions The Council of Auditors (CoA) is a council of varying size, typically two to four people, who are elected for the duration of a Python release. One member of the CoA is considered the President, who has some minor points of authority over the other members.
The CoA has responsibility for reviewing controversial decisions in the form of PEPs written by members of the core development team. The CoA may choose to accept a PEP exactly as presented, or may request clarification or changes. These changes may be of any form and for any reason. This flexibility is intentional, and allows the process to change over time as different members are elected to the CoA. See the later sections of this document for examples of the kinds of requests that are expected.
The CoA only pronounces on PEPs submitted to python-committers. There is no expectation that the CoA follows or participates on any other mailing lists. (Note that this implies that only core developers may submit PEPs. Non-core developers may write and discuss proposals on other mailing lists, but without a core developer willing to support the proposal by requesting pronouncement, it cannot proceed to acceptance. This is essentially the same as the current system, but is made explicit here to ensure that members of the CoA are not expected to deal with proposals that are not supported by at least one core developer.) The CoA may not delegate authority to individuals who have not been elected by the core developer team. (One relevant case here is that this changes the implementation of the existing BDFL-Delegate system, though without necessarily changing the spirit of that system.
See the later sections, particularly example scenario four, for more discussion on this point.) The Release Manager (RM) is also permitted the same ability to request changes on any PEPs that specify the release they are responsible for. After feature freeze, the RM retains this responsibility for their release, while the CoA rotates and begins to focus on the subsequent release. This is no different from the current process.
The process for selection of a RM is not changed in this proposal. Core developers are responsible for electing members of the CoA, and have the ability to call a “vote of no confidence” against a member of the CoA. The details of these votes are discussed in a later section. Where discussions between core developers and members of the CoA appear to be ongoing but unfruitful, the President may step in to overrule either party.
Where the discussion involves the President, it should be handled using a vote of no confidence. Members of the CoA may choose to resign at any point. If at least two members of the CoA remain, they may request a new election to refill the group. If only one member remains, the election is triggered automatically. (The scenario when the President resigns is described in a later section.) The intended balance of power is that the core developers will elect members of the CoA who reflect the direction and have the trust of the development team, and also have the ability to remove members who do not honour commitments made prior to election.
Regular decision process Regular decisions continue to be made as at present. For the sake of clarity, controversial decisions require a PEP, and any decisions requiring a PEP are considered as controversial. The CoA may be asked to advise on whether a decision would be better made using the controversial decision process, or individual members of the CoA may volunteer such a suggestion, but the core development team is not bound by this advice.
Controversial decision process Controversial decisions are always written up as PEPs, following the existing process. The approver (formerly “BDFL-Delegate”) is always the CoA, and can no longer be delegated. Note that this does not prevent the CoA from deciding to nominate a core developer to assess the proposal and provide the CoA with a recommendation, which is essentially the same as the current delegation process.
The CoA will pronounce on PEPs submitted to python-committers with a request for pronouncement. Any member of the CoA, or the current RM, may request changes to a PEP for any reason, provided they include some indication of what additional work is required to meet their expectations. See later sections for examples of expected reasons. When all members of the CoA and the RM indicate that they have no concerns with a PEP, it is formally accepted.
When one or more members of the CoA fail to respond in a reasonable time, the President of the CoA may choose to interpret that as implied approval. Failure of the President to respond should be handled using a vote of no confidence. Election terms Members of the CoA are elected for the duration of a release. The members are elected prior to feature freeze for the previous release, and hold their position until feature freeze fo
The rest of this page is on the live site.