GHSL-2020-313: Unauthorized repository modification or secrets exfiltration in a GitHub workflow of BitByte-TPC/first-bit | GitHub Security Lab
skip to content Resources Open Source Community Enterprise / Security Lab Research Advisories CodeQL Wall of Fame Resources Open Source Community Enterprise Events Get Involved Coordinated Disclosure Timeline 2020-11-30: Issue reported to the maintainer. 2020-11-30-2021-02-23: Attempted to contact maintainers multiple times. 2021-02-28: Disclosure deadline reached. 2021-03-02: Public issue created. 2021-12-29: Maintainer replies that the workflow has been disabled.
Summary The auto_merge.yml GitHub workflow is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of the base repository or secrets exfiltration from a Pull Request. Product BitByte-TPC/first-bit GitHub repository Tested Version The latest changeset a43fb3c to the date. Details Issue: Untrusted code is explicitly checked out and run on a Pull Request from a fork pull_request_target was introduced to allow triggered workflows to comment on PRs, label them, assign people, etc..
In order to make it possible the triggered action runner has read/write token for the base repository and the access to secrets. In order to prevent untrusted code from execution it runs in a context of the base repository. By explicitly checking out and running build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets. on : pull_request_target : paths : - ' public/directory/**.json' ... uses : actions/checkout@v2 with : ref : ${{github.event.pull_request.head.ref}} repository : ${{github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name}} - name : Yarn install uses : actions/setup-node@v1 - run : yarn install Impact The vulnerability allows for unauthorized modification of the base repository and secrets exfiltration.
Credit This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski) . Contact You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com , please include a reference to GHSL-2020-313 in any communication regarding this issue.