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Deserialized delegate — CodeQL query help documentation

CodeQL query help documentation » CodeQL query help for C# » Deserialized delegate ¶ ID: cs/deserialized-delegate Kind: problem Security severity: 9.8 Severity: warning Precision: high Tags: - security - external/cwe/cwe-502 Query suites: - csharp-code-scanning.qls - csharp-security-extended.qls - csharp-security-and-quality.qls Click to see the query in the CodeQL repository Deserializing a delegate object may result in remote code execution, when an attacker can control the serialized data.

Recommendation ¶ Avoid deserializing delegate objects, if possible, or make sure that the serialized data cannot be controlled by an attacker. Example ¶ In this example, a file stream is deserialized to a Func<int> object, using a BinaryFormatter . The file stream is a parameter of a public method, so depending on the calls to InvokeSerialized , this may or may not pose a security problem. using System ; using System.IO ; using System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary ; class Bad { public static int InvokeSerialized ( FileStream fs ) { var formatter = new BinaryFormatter (); // BAD var f = ( Func < int > ) formatter .

Deserialize ( fs ); return f (); } } References ¶ Microsoft: BinaryFormatter Class . Common Weakness Enumeration: CWE-502 . © GitHub, Inc. Terms Privacy