mod_ssl_ct - Apache HTTP Server Version 2.5
Modules | Directives | FAQ | Glossary | Sitemap | Report a bug Apache HTTP Server Version 2.5 Apache > HTTP Server > Documentation > Version 2.5 > Modules Apache Module mod_ssl_ct Available Languages: en | fr Description: Implementation of Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962) Status: Deprecated Module Identifier: ssl_ct_module Source File: mod_ssl_ct.c Summary This module provides an implementation of Certificate Transparency, in conjunction with mod_ssl and command-line tools from the certificate-transparency open source project.
The goal of Certificate Transparency is to expose the use of server certificates which are trusted by browsers but were mistakenly or maliciously issued. More information about Certificate Transparency is available at http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ . Key terminology used in this documentation: Certificate log A certificate log, referred to simply as log in this documentation, is a network service to which server certificates have been submitted.
A user agent can confirm that the certificate of a server which it accesses has been submitted to a log which it trusts, and that the log itself has not been tampered with. Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) This is an acknowledgment from a log that it has accepted a valid certificate. It is signed with the log's public key. One or more SCTs is passed to clients during the handshake, either in the ServerHello (TLS extension), certificate extension, or in a stapled OCSP response.
This implementation for Apache httpd provides these features for TLS servers and proxies: Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) can be obtained from logs automatically and, in conjunction with any statically configured SCTs, sent to aware clients in the ServerHello (during the handshake). SCTs can be received by the proxy from origin servers in the ServerHello, in a certificate extension, and/or within stapled OCSP responses; any SCTs received can be partially validated on-line and optionally queued for off-line audit.
The proxy can be configured to disallow communication with an origin server which does not provide an SCT which passes on-line validation. Configuration information about logs can be defined statically in the web server configuration or maintained in a SQLite3 database. In the latter case, mod_ssl_ct will reload the database periodically, so any site-specific infrastructure for maintaining and propagating log configuration information does not have to also restart httpd to make it take effect.
This module is experimental for the following reasons: Insufficient test and review Reliance on an unreleased version of OpenSSL (1.0.2, Beta 3 or later) for basic operation Incomplete off-line audit capability Configuration mechanisms, format of data saved for off-line audit, and other characteristics are subject to change based on further feedback and testing. Topics Server processing overview Proxy processing overview Log configuration Storing SCTs in a form consumable by mod_ssl_ct Logging CT status in the access log Off-line audit for proxy Directives CTAuditStorage CTLogClient CTLogConfigDB CTMaxSCTAge CTProxyAwareness CTSCTStorage CTServerHelloSCTLimit CTStaticLogConfig CTStaticSCTs Bugfix checklist httpd changelog Known issues Report a bug Server processing overview ¶ Servers need to send SCTs to their clients.
SCTs in a certificate extension or stapled OCSP response will be sent without any special program logic. This module handles sending SCTs configured by the administrator or received from configured logs. The number of SCTs sent in the ServerHello (i.e., not including those in a certificate extension or stapled OCSP response) can be limited by the CTServerHelloSCTLimit directive. For each server certificate, a daemon process maintains an SCT list to be sent in the ServerHello, created from statically configured SCTs as well as those received from logs.
Logs marked as untrusted or with a maximum valid timestamp before the present time will be ignored. Periodically the daemon will submit certificates to a log as necessary (due to changed log configuration or age) and rebuild the concatenation of SCTs. The SCT list for a server certificate will be sent to any client that indicates awareness in the ClientHello when that particular server certificate is used. Proxy processing overview ¶ The proxy indicates Certificate Transparency awareness in the ClientHello by including the signed_certificate_timestamp extension.
It can recognize SCTs received in the ServerHello, in an extension in the certificate for an origin server, or in a stapled OCSP response. On-line verification is attempted for each received SCT: For any SCT, the timestamp can be checked to see if it is not yet valid based on the current time as well as any configured valid time interval for the log. For an SCT from a log for which a public key is configured, the server signature will be checked.
If verification fails for at least one SCT and verification was not successful for at least one SCT, the connection is aborted if CTProxyAwareness is set to require . Additionally, the server certificate chain and SCTs are stored for off-line verification if the CTAuditStorage directive is configured. As an optimization, on-line verification and storing of data from the server is only performed the first time a web server child process receives the data.
This saves some processing time as well as disk space. For typical reverse proxy setups, very little processing overhead will be required. Log configuration ¶ Servers and proxies use different information about logs for their processing. This log configuration can be set in two ways: Create a log configuration database using ctlogconfig , and configure the path to that database using the CTLogConfig directive. This method of configuration supports dynamic updates; mod_ssl_ct will re-read the database at intervals.
Additionally, the off-line audit program ctauditscts can use this configuration to find the URL of logs. Configure information about logs statically using the CTStaticLogConfig directive. As with all other directives, the server must be restarted in order to pick up changes to the directives. The information that can be configured about a log using either mechanism is described below: log id The log id is the SHA-256 hash of the log's public key, and is part of every SCT.
This is a convenient way to identify a particular log when configuring valid timestamp ranges or certain other information. public key of the log A proxy must have the public key of the log in order to check the signature in SCTs it receives which were obtained from the log. A server must have the public key of the log in order to submit certificates to it. general trust/distrust setting This is a mechanism to distrust or restore trust in a particular log, for whatever reason (including simply avoiding interaction with the log in situations where it is off-line). minimum and/or maximum valid timestamps When configured, the proxy will check that timestamps from SCTs are within the valid range. log URL The URL of the log (for its API) is required by a server in order to submit server certificates to the log.
The server will submit each server certificate in order to obtain an SCT for each log with a configured URL, except when the log is also marked as distrusted or the current time is not within any configured valid timestamp range. The log URL is also needed by off-line auditing of SCTs received by a proxy. Generally, only a small subset of this information is configured for a particular log. Refer to the documentation for the CTStaticLogConfig directive and the ctlogconfig command for more specific information.
Storing SCTs in a form consumable by mod_ssl_ct ¶ mod_ssl_ct allows you to configure SCTs statically using the CTStaticSCTs directive. These must be in binary form, ready to send to a client. Sample code in the form of a Python script to build an SCT in the correct format from data received fr
The rest of this page is on the live site.