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Revocation-status source for Apple… | Apple Developer Forums

Revocation-status source for Apple Code Signing Certification Authority (serial 0x21) Code Signing General Code Signing Signing Certificates You’re now watching this thread. If you’ve opted in to email or web notifications, you’ll be notified when there’s activity. Click again to stop watching or visit your profile to manage watched threads and notifications. You’ve stopped watching this thread and will no longer receive emails or web notifications when there’s activity.

Click again to start watching. Sebastian_Grey OP Created Oct ’26 Replies 8 Boosts 0 Views 1.2k Participants 2 Hello, What is the supported revocation-status source or documented validation procedure for the following exact intermediate certificate, encountered in signatures on Apple-supplied Command Line Tools Python 3.9? This concerns first-party Apple code signing, not Developer ID, public TLS, or S/MIME. Certificate details Subject: CN=Apple Code Signing Certification Authority, OU=Apple Certification Authority, O=Apple Inc., C=US Serial: 0x21 (33 decimal) DER SHA-256: 5bdab1288fc16892fef50c658db54f1e2e19cf8f71cc55f77de2b95e051e2562 Validity: 2011-10-24 17:39:41 UTC to 2026-10-24 17:39:41 UTC Issuer: Apple Root CA Issuer DER SHA-256: b0b1730ecbc7ff4505142c49f1295e6eda6bcaed7e2c68c5be91b5a11001f024 Embedded CRL distribution point: http://www.apple.com/appleca/root.crl This intermediate has no Authority Information Access extension.

Retained observations from 1 October 2026 At approximately 16:59 UTC, one request to: https://www.apple.com/appleca/root.crl recorded HTTP 200 and returned a 511-byte CRL with: thisUpdate: 2025-03-10 21:28:16 UTC nextUpdate: 2025-07-23 21:28:16 UTC SHA-256: 02b300d7e2edc09a33c0e98c0291da47932320761f6060ea8d7624f6e344f1dd At approximately 20:02 UTC, a separate request to: https://crl.apple.com/root.crl recorded HTTP 404 and returned a 287-byte HTML error body.

This was an alternative HTTPS candidate; it does not establish the behavior of its HTTP counterpart. Neither request followed redirects or retried. Response bodies and normalized collector records were retained, but raw HTTP headers and stderr were not retained. These are limited observations from that date, not a claim about global service availability or key compromise. Questions Which current Apple-published source provides signed revocation-status evidence covering this exact intermediate?

If the distribution point has moved, what is the authoritative replacement and how is its scope established? Which CP/CPS or documented first-party validation mechanism applies to this certificate? In particular, does Apple Certificate Policy v7.0 (20 March 2026), sections 2.1 and 4.10, cover this chain? If a public revocation-status service is no longer supported for this legacy first-party CA, what documented verification approach should be used, or which Apple team handles this question?

I am not treating an expired CRL or an HTTP error as evidence that the certificate is revoked. I am also not assuming that a standalone CRL lookup reproduces macOS trust evaluation. I am asking for the supported source and verification procedure, not for a way to bypass validation, change trust settings, or re-sign Apple binaries. Thank you. Replies 8 Boosts 0 Views 1.2k Participants 2 DTS Engineer OP Apple Oct ’26 What’s your high-level goal here?

The Apple PKI page has links to various CA policy docs, but those are only part of the picture. Apple operating systems have various other mechanisms to prevent code from running, so you’re unlikely to get a meaningful signal via the certificate revocation path. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" Add comment Sebastian_Grey OP Oct ’26 Thank you, Quinn.

Our high-level goal is to establish a supported, auditable verification procedure for an unmodified Apple-supplied Command Line Tools Python executable used by local development tooling. We want to distinguish code-signature integrity and Apple origin, the result of the relevant macOS trust or execution-policy assessment, and any independently available certificate-revocation evidence. We are not trying to replace macOS trust evaluation with a standalone CRL check, bypass an operating-system decision, change trust settings, or re-sign Apple binaries.

For this first-party Apple command-line executable, which supported verification procedure and retained diagnostic evidence would you recommend? What does that evidence establish, and what should we avoid inferring from it? Our narrower certificate question remains whether Apple publishes current revocation-status evidence covering this exact legacy intermediate, or documents that such evidence is not publicly available.

We would keep that limitation separate from the operating system’s assessment. Add comment DTS Engineer OP Apple Oct ’26 So you’re specifically concerned with the copy of Python installed by the Command Line Tools package? That is, the Command Line Tools package that folks download from our Developer > Downloads > More Downloads page? Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" Add comment Sebastian_Grey OP Oct ’26 Yes — exactly.

I’m referring specifically to the copy of Python installed by Apple’s standalone Command Line Tools package obtained from Developer > Downloads > More Downloads. In particular, I mean the unmodified Apple-delivered Python framework/executable under /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/..., not the Python copy inside Xcode.app, not a macOS system Python, and not a Homebrew or other third-party installation. My goal is to have a supported, auditable procedure for that specific Apple-delivered executable that distinguishes: code-signature integrity and origin; whether macOS currently accepts it under the system’s trust/execution policy; and if independent revocation evidence for its signing chain is required, what Apple-supported source or procedure should be used for that evidence.

I’m not trying to replace macOS trust evaluation, modify trust settings, bypass execution policy, or re-sign the binary. Thanks for narrowing the scope. Add comment DTS Engineer OP Apple Oct ’26 Thanks for the clarification. I’m pretty sure I have answers for at least some of your questions, but I want to ask one more question before that… You want to run this check on the Mac, right? That is, you want to run code on a specific Mac that checks that the /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools stuff installed on that Mac is valid?

I’m asking because such a check can take advantage of macOS machinery that’s not available, say, if you were trying to run the check on some Linux server. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" Add comment Sebastian_Grey OP Oct ’26 Yes — exactly. The check would run locally on the specific Mac whose standalone Command Line Tools installation we want to validate.

In particular, we want to inspect the Apple-delivered Python under /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/... as installed on that Mac. The check can absolutely take advantage of macOS system frameworks, trust services, code-signing APIs, or other Apple-supported local machinery available on that Mac. We do not need the procedure to be portable to Linux or to work as an offline remote verifier. Our preference is for a non-destructive, auditable procedure that does not modify trust settings, bypass execution policy, or re-sign anything.

If macOS already provides a supported way to determine that the installed CLT Python is valid and currently accepted under the system’s code-signing/trust policy, that is exactly the procedure we are looking for. Add comment DTS Engineer OP Apple Oct ’26 OK, so there are three parts to this: Is the code signature valid? Is it code you

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